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Culture	wars:	post-revolutionary	mobilization	in	Nepal1		
By	Dan	Vesalainen	Hirslund	
Introduction	
In	the	immediate	aftermath	of	the	2006	peace	agreement	in	Nepal	which	put	an	end	to	10	
years	of	Maoist	insurgency	and	transformed	the	erstwhile	rural	guerilla	movement	into	an	
urban-based	political	party,	a	large	number	of	people	signed	up	to	become	members	of	the	
Communist	Party	of	Nepal	–	Maoist	(CPN-M).	Local	newspapers	carried	horrifying	stories	of	
the	kidnappings	and	killings	of	rival	party	members	or	rich	businessmen	who	had	resisted	ex-
tortion	and	it	was	rumored	that	the	Maoists	kept	a	“torture	chamber”	in	an	abandoned	indus-
trial	area	on	the	outskirts	of	the	capital,	Kathmandu.	But	why	would	so	many	young	people	–	
estimates	hover	between	10,000	and	100,000	-	sign	up	to	join	a	political	movement	with	such	
a	poor	reputation	and,	even	more	curiously,	why	do	so	after	the	revolutionary	war	had	ended?	
What	could	possibly	drive	young	men	–	for	they	were	mostly	male	–	to	become	engaged	in	
Maoist	revolutionary	politics	when	the	‘revolution’,	for	all	practical	purposes,	was	over,	and	
there	seemed	to	be	very	few	tangible	benefits	of	participating	in	the	machinery	of	organized	
party	politics?	
The	initial	surprise	of	this	new	politicization	of	young	urbanites	soon	morphed	into	a	
much	more	cynical	idea,	that	the	Maoist	movement	was	merely	sweeping	up	poor	and	unedu-
cated	youth	to	do	their	dirty	work	and	that	the	entire	political	maneuver	was	merely	an	exploi-
tation	of	political	labor	that	due	to	its	capacity	for	violence	undermined	a	fragile	post-war	
transition	to	peace.	Yet	a	closer	look	at	the	Maoist	movement	soon	reveals	two	important	
features	of	mobilization	that	make	such	conclusions	hard	to	sustain:	one	that	members	re-
ceived	no	particular	benefits	under	the	tutelage	of	the	organization	and	two,	that	members	
joined	entirely	on	their	own	accord	rather	than	as	a	reaction	to	social	or	direct	forms	of	pres-
sure.	Members	joining	in	the	post-war	phase	did	not	receive	economic	compensation	for	their	
work,	allowing	them	to	turn	it	into	a	paid	“job”,	neither	did	they	get	access	to	the	jealously	
guarded	wealth	of	the	party	and	to	the	advancements	that	made	such	forms	of	patronage	
hoarding	possible,	allowing	them	to	treat	membership	as	a	“career”.2	They	were	also	often	
actively	dissuaded	from	joining,	not	only	from	friends	and	relatives	but	indeed	from	movement	
members	as	well,	who	were	not	interested	in	opportunistic	colleagues.	These	two	observa-
tions	immediately	dispel	two	prevalent	discourses	on	Maoist	post-war	mobilization;	namely	
that	people	were	adequately	rewarded	in	material	terms	or	that	they	were	forced.	This	then	
raises	an	important	question:	why	would	young	people	turn	to	politics	and,	indeed,	to	violence	
in	a	context	of	a	peace	process	where	violence	had	in	fact	lost	its	legitimacy	as	a	tool	for	politi-
                                                
1 This	is	a	preprint	version	of	a	book	chapter,	which	will	be	published	in	2018	at	the	University	of	Chica-
go	Press.	The	book	is	edited	by	Steffen	Jensen	and	Henrik	Vigh	and	deals	with	processes	of	radicalisa-
tion.	If	quoting,	please	refer	to	UCPH	Curis	Archive	(curis.ku.dk). 
2	This	contrasts	with	the	other	important	Maoist	youth	organization,	the	student	movement	ANNISU-R,	
populated	by	educated	and	mainly	high-caste	urbanite,	and	where	mobilization	is	a	career	path	within	
the	party	(Snellinger	2009b).	
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cal	negotiation	and	where	the	movement	itself	professed	to	be	on	a	path	to	peaceful	demo-
cratic	participation?	
In	this	chapter	I	offer	an	explanation	of	Maoist	youth	mobilization	through	an	analysis	
of	the	new	political	space	that	was	opened	up	in	the	transition	from	war	to	peace.	I	show	how	
mobilization	to	the	Maoist	movement	was	shaped	by	wider	generational	dynamics	of	the	polit-
ical	sphere	as	well	as	by	the	revolutionary	ethos	through	which	members	became	integrated.	
By	locating	the	question	of	mobilization	within	the	concrete	socio-political	environment,	I	ar-
gue	that	young	activists	were	in	fact	caught	up	in	overlapping	movement	processes.	Although	
they	were	not	immediately	aware	of	this,	these	processes	circumscribed	their	participation	in,	
and	experiences	of,	what	Ghassan	Hage	has	termed	alter-politics;	i.e.	collective	projects	that	
seek	to	unsettle	or	escape	from	historically	hegemonic	modalities	of	social	and	political	space	
(Hage	2014).	This	analysis	should	not	detract	us,	of	course,	from	the	extortions,	kidnappings	
and	street	confrontations	through	which	Maoist	cadres	occupy	political	space:	it	has	been	
estimated	that	Maoist	members	perpetrated	over	half	of	the	electoral	violence	between	No-
vember	2007	and	April	2008	where	50	people	were	killed,	1,286	wounded	and	116	kidnapped	
Lawoti	(2009:	293).	Yet,	as	reported	by	the	International	Crisis	Group	(2008:	i),	the	Maoist’s	
“strong-arm	tactics”	was	only	a	more	successful	variant	of	the	tactics	employed	by	other	par-
ties	and	while	the	CPN-M	had	been	brought	into	parliamentary	politics,	dozens	of	armed	
groups	in	the	Terai	(Southern	Nepal)	were	actively	fighting	the	state	and	seeking	to	disrupt	the	
political	transition	to	peace	(ICG	2007).	The	question	of	violence	in	the	Maoist	movement	is	
therefore	a	complex	one	that	relates	to	the	confrontational	nature	of	political	contestation	in	
the	post-insurrection	years	and	a	proper	investigation	of	its	nature	and	cause	would	also	have	
to	address	the	institutionalized	relationships	between	overt/invisible	and	direct/indirect	vio-
lence	in	Nepali	society	at	large	and	the	way	it	maps	onto	the	class	landscape	of	non-political	
and	political	culture.	While	the	Maoist	revolutionary	war	can	be	said	to	have	heightened	and	
popularized	forms	of	power	that	built	on	histories	of	violent	opposition	to	the	state,	their	
emergence	on	the	urban	scene	has	largely	taken	place	through	a	demilitarization	of	the	
movement’s	capacity	for	violence;	cadres	now	carry	sticks	instead	of	guns,	if	anything	at	all.	A	
narrow	focus	on	Maoist	violence	risks	singling	out	a	phenomenon	which	is	not	a	remarkable	
trait	of	any	one	particular	grouping	and,	worse,	overestimates	its	explanatory	power	to	the	
detriment	of	more	important	dynamics	of	transitory	political	culture	in	Nepal.	
The	analysis	presented	in	this	chapter	addresses	mobilization	and	violence	by	looking	
at	how	questions	of	legitimate	political	action	are	folded	into	discourses	of	membership	and	
the	consolidation	of	particular	institutional	environments.	I	shall	examine	the	role	of	genera-
tion	in	Nepali	political	culture	and	the	new	space	afforded	by	‘youth’	in	an	otherwise	geronto-
logical	party	culture,	in	order	to	argue	that	the	contradictory	movement	histories	which	mobi-
lize	members’	willing	participation	risks	perpetrating	the	kind	of	injustices	that	are	sought	
eradicated,	only	in	new	forms.3	As	described	in	the	introduction	to	this	volume,	it	is	by	engag-
ing	the	wider	societal	and	organizational	dynamics	of	movements	that	a	more	nuanced	under-
standing	of	‘the	turn	to	violence’	can	be	gauged.	In	line	with	the	editors’	conceptualization	of	
                                                
3	The	data	for	this	article	builds	on	dissertation	fieldwork	for	12	months	from	2009	and	onwards.	I	have	
conducted	in-depth	participant-observation	with	the	Young	Communist	League	–	the	largest	youth	
movement	in	Nepal	–	and	have	continued	to	explore	the	transformations	of	the	Maoist	movement	in	
the	transition	from	insurrection	to	parliamentary	politics.	
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‘dualist	perspectivism’,	I	argue	that	it	is	by	paying	attention	to	these	intertwining	processes	
that	we	should	make	sense	of	the	complicated	sociopolitical	field	through	which	the	Maoist	
movement	managed	to	transform	its	guerilla	popularity	into	a	more	sustainable	script	for	par-
ty	mobilization	in	a	fractured	and	competitive	urban	environment.	In	trying	to	think	about	how	
revolutionary	politics,	youth	mobilization	and	violence	are	connected,	I	will	seek	to	unpack	the	
dialectical	relationship	between	activists	and	the	organization	–	rather	than	focusing	on	the	
particular	activities	members	are	engaged	in	–	as	I	see	this	as	a	crucial	dynamic	for	a	nuanced	
understanding	of	radical	politics.	This	perspective	builds	on	recent	anthropological	theories	of	
the	‘micro-politics’	of	state	sovereignty	and	popular	mobilization	(Hansen	and	Stepputat	2001;	
Das	and	Poole	2004;	Hansen	and	Stepputat	2005)	and	the	large	body	of	literature	on	social	
movements	(Edelman	2001;	Nash	2004;	Barker	et	al.	2013)	as	it	seeks	to	combine	the	‘micro’-
dynamics	of	membership	with	the	social	and	political	context	that	authorizes	organizations	
and	frames	available	discourses	in	the	first	place.	The	analysis	presented	here	highlights	the	
variegated	processes	through	which	people	become	allied	with	radical	political	projects	and	
the	elementary	embeddedness	of	political	positions	irrespective	of	the	ideology	espoused.	
The	aim	of	the	chapter	is	to	illustrate	how	political	culture	-	the	power	of	institutions,	
of	political	space	and	the	workings	of	ideology	-	condition	mobilization;	and	thus	to	bring	polit-
ical	culture	into	the	equation	when	evaluating	individual	motivations	and	narratives	of	joining	
violent	movements.	It	seeks	to	bring	out	the	‘social	invisibility’	of	Maoist	revolutionaries	and	to	
situate	their	potency	as	political	actors	within	the	gendered	and,	in	particular,	generational	
environments	in	which	they	are	formed	so	as	to	ground	mobilization	in	unique	historical	cir-
cumstances.	I	shall	begin	my	exploration	by	building	on	Raymond	Williams’	expanded	under-
standing	of	‘culture’	to	situate	the	processes	within	which	the	Maoist	movement	developed	its	
politics	and	to	argue	that	the	trope	of	an	emergent	or	alternative	culture	can	help	us	ground	
revolutionary	mobilization	in	the	Nepal	context	and	to	enrich	the	concept	of	political	culture.	
Repositioning	Williams’	contribution	to	work	within	the	context	of	fierce	political	competition,	
I	then	discuss	how	new	members	navigated	different	livelihood	trajectories	(captured	by	the	
editors’	notion	of	‘tangential	futures’)	and	how	Maoist	recruiters	aggressively	championed	a	
new	identity	for	political	youth.	This	takes	me	into	a	consideration	over	competing	‘cultures’	
for	youth	in	the	national	rebuilding	efforts	after	the	2006	peace	agreement	and	the	contradic-
tory	alliances	this	‘culture	war’	landed	CPN-M	in.	In	the	last	two	sections,	I	zoom	in	on	Maoist	
institutional	culture	and	practices	of	authority	to	discuss,	and	reveal,	how	youth	both	became	
a	mobilizing	trope	and	a	new	blind	spot	for	a	movement	committed	to	ideas	of	permanent	
social	change.	
Maoist	radicalism	and	the	politics	of	culture	
The	highly	successful	military	campaign	waged	by	the	CPN-M	between	1996	and	2006	has	for	a	
long	time	posed	something	of	a	conundrum	to	researchers	who	have	striven	to	provide	a	satis-
factory	explanation	of	the	all-to	easy	mobilization	of	the	rural	population	as	the	movement	
advanced	from	its	base	in	the	Western	mountains	to	encompass	two-thirds	of	the	country,	
including	targeted	attacks	in	the	country’s	capital,	Kathmandu	(Hutt	2004a;	Lawoti	and	Pahari	
2010;	Thapa	2003;	Thapa	and	Bandit	2004;	Upreti	2008).	While	initial	explanations	sought	to	
apply	classical	“grievance”	and	“greed”	models	from	the	social	movement	literature	(Eck	
2009),	statistical	analyses	could	not	confirm	a	strong	correlation	between	poverty	and	move-
ment	success	(Bray	et	al		2003;	Bohara	et	al	2006)	and	because	so	little	was	known	of	the	in-
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ternal	workings	of	the	movement,	the	question	of	what	characterized	“greed”	for	a	movement	
with	very	limited	access	to	economic	exploits	and	which	did	not	seem	to	abuse	its	military	
strength	to	repay	its	cadres	in	kind	–	in	fact	self-enrichment	was	abhorred	and	punished	during	
the	war	–	continued	to	puzzle	researchers.4	Later	explanations,	based	on	careful	observations	
of	the	sociopolitical	dynamics	of	rural	Nepal,	offered	a	much	more	multifaceted	picture	of	
engrained	caste	and	gender	hierarchies,	lost	generational	opportunities	and	a	highly	adaptable	
movement	tactic	that	-	combining	fear,	traditional	cultural	forms	and	carefully	crafted	ideolog-
ical	rhetoric	-	managed	to	build	a	surprisingly	loyal	cadre-force	of	rural	youth,	men	as	well	as	
women,	in	just	a	few	years	(Shneiderman	and	Turin	2004;	Lecomte-Tilouine	2010b;	Zharkevich	
2009;	de	Sales	2008;	Mottin	2009).	
In	this	chapter,	I	build	on	these	insights	to	suggest	that	popular	insurgencies	like	the	
Nepali	Maoist	movement	are	highly	contingent	phenomena,	held	together	by	a	number	of	
sociopolitical	dynamics	without	which	‘radicalism’	has	a	much	more	limited	chance	of	emerg-
ing.	To	explore	the	characteristics	of	this	framework,	I	build	on	the	theories	of	Raymond	Wil-
liams	and	his	concept	of	cultural	forms	to	situate	the	volume’s	themes	in	the	Nepali	context.	
Williams,	trained	at	Cambridge	in	the	1940s,	developed	a	unique	perspective	on	the	sociopolit-
ical	transformation	of	England	during	the	post-war	years	based	on	a	Marxist	historical	perspec-
tive	but	with	a	special	emphasis	on	the	powerful	role	of	culture	to	reflect,	absorb	and	diversify	
prevalent	hegemonies.	In	his	influential	‘Marxism	and	Literature’	from	1977	William	argued,	
adapting	Gramsci	to	his	interest	in	works	of	art,	that	the	individual’s	submission	to	dominant	
ideologies	took	place	through	the	stealthy	work	of	culture	and	that	culture	itself,	because	of	its	
close	connection	to	human	experience,	worked	through	‘incorporation’	and	was	always	more	
“than	the	sum	of	[society’s]	institutions”	(Williams	1977:	118).	To	account	for	this	multiplicity	
and	taking	seriously	Gramsci’s	assertion	that	hegemony	was	a	process	–	thus	distancing	him-
self	from	the	French-Althusserian	school	of	Marxism	at	the	time	–	Williams	stressed	the	work	
of	active	social	and	cultural	substance	as	the	key	to	unlocking	the	dialectical	relationship	be-
tween	hegemonic	formations	and	the	unfolding	of	human	life,	or	what	he	also	referred	to	as	
‘specialized	practice.’	
Williams’	concept	of	culture	was	formulated	in	a	context	of	emergent	urban	modernity	
and	has	more	in	common	with	the	urban	sociology	school	that	developed	around	the	Universi-
ty	of	Chicago	in	the	1960’s	than	with	the	anthropological	concept	of	culture,	which	was	still	
preoccupied	with	the	study	of	‘primitive’	village	societies	in	the	third	world.	Yet,	later	devel-
opment	of	the	culture	concept,	and	in	particular	the	strong	criticisms	against	its	homogenizing	
tendencies	(see	Abu-Lughod	1991)	have	warned	against	the	slippery	identification	of	groups	
with	particular	–	and	mutually	exclusive	–	cultures;	in	slipping	imperceptibly	from	the	analyti-
cal	to	the	descriptive	realm,	it	increasingly	came	to	be	seen	as	a	thing	and	consequently	start-
ed	doing	things	(Trouillot	2003).	Keeping	Williams’	culture-concept	at	a	skeptical	distance,	
however,	it	is	possible	to	resurrect	the	larger	point	he	was	trying	to	address	with	his	work,	
                                                
4	See	the	different	explanations	offered,	respectively,	by	the	human	rights	researcher	Rita	Manchanda	
highlighting	the	empowerment	of	women	(Manchanda	2004),	anthropologist	Tatsuro	Fujikura	who	
looked	to	the	power	of	ideology	(Fujikura	2003),	and	anthropologist	Sara	Shneiderman	who	has	located	
the	growth	of	Maoism	in	histories	of	opposition	to	the	state	and	decades	of	consciousness-raising	
(Shneiderman	2009).	Most	researchers	on	Nepali	Maoism	have	in	fact	neglected	this	last	important	
aspect	the	movement’s	success.	
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namely	the	ways	in	which	configurations	of	class	became	expressed	through	–	and	hence	dis-
placed	onto	–	cultural	identities.	Williams	speaks	not	of	culture	as	a	fixed	set	of	individual	or	
group	identities	–	the	way	in	which	it	has	been	used	for	decades	in	anthropology	and	rightly	
criticized	–	but	as	the	manifestation	of	relationships	between	groups	with	varying	power.	
Hence,	it	is	not	‘Culture’	as	the	end	object	of	analysis	that	interests	Williams	but	cultural	for-
mations	–	historical	processes	of	group	expressions	and	identifications	that	articulate	social	
and	political	dislocations.	
To	formalize	his	framework,	Williams	suggested	a	tripartite	differentiation	between	
cultural	formations;	there	were	formations	that	were	clearly	hegemonic,	in	that	they	reflected	
the	dominant	ideology	of	society;	then	there	were	cultures	that	were	rather	residual,	siphon-
ing	off	from	the	dominant	ideology	but	somehow	redundant	in	the	new	sociopolitical	order	
and	which	could,	at	times,	be	both	allied	with	the	dominant	culture	and	at	other	times	against	
it.	Williams	mentions	the	role	of	religious	cultures	to	this	effect;	it	was	to	some	extent	incorpo-
rated	into	a	capitalist	state-form	–	Weber’s	classical	argument	in	“the	protestant	ethic”	(We-
ber	1992)	–	but	might	also	play	a	more	critical	role.	Cultural	forms	could	also	be	directly	oppo-
sitional	or	alternative	to	the	hegemonic	framework,	however.	This	was,	in	William’s	analysis,	
the	role	the	proletariat	played	in	Marx’s	analysis,	as	a	class	which,	while	activated	by	the	dom-
inant	ideology,	grew	conscious	of	its	own	peculiarity	and	could	eventually	become	directly	
opposed	to	the	dominant	culture	from	which	they	were	born;	the	well-known	“class	for	itself”	
argument	(Borland	2008:	137).	
Williams’	analysis	opens	up	for	a	more	complicated	narrative	on	the	establishment	of	
oppositional	classes	than	in	the	kind	of	Marxist	literature	that	expects	the	experience	of	capi-
talist	oppression	to	automatically	resolve	into	collective	class	consciousness.	Williams	is	in-
sistent	that	class	emergence	is	also	a	cultural	emergence,	one	that	is	even	“pre-emergent”	in	
that	these	cultural	forms	may	precede	the	formation	of	a	critical	consciousness	(ibid.:126).	
Anthropologists	of	most	hues	would	readily	accept	that	cultural	processes	are	to	some	extent	
both	pre-reflective	and	collective	forms	through	which	people	express	their	desires	and	be-
liefs.	Williams	asks	us	to	take	the	study	of	cultural	forms	seriously,	not	because	they	are	mono-
lithic	representations	of	consciousness	–	the	Geertzian	argument	(Geertz	1973)	–	but	rather	
because	they	mediate	power;	the	power	of	institutions	–	traditional	and	political	–	and	the	
power	of	imagination.	
In	this	essay,	I	use	Williams	framework	to	enrich	our	understanding	of	political	pro-
cesses	and	not	as	a	concept	for	thinking	about	groups’	primary	identifications	and	characteris-
tics.	Transposed	onto	a	political	domain,	it	becomes	possible	to	speak	of	political	culture	in	the	
original	sense	proposed	by	Gabriel	Almond	and	Sidney	Verba	(1963)	as	a	“set	of	attitudes,	
beliefs	and	sentiments	that	give	order	and	meaning	to	a	political	process	and	which	provide	
the	underlying	assumptions	and	rules	that	govern	behaviour	in	the	political	system”.	Unlike	
Almond	and	Verba,	however,	for	whom	political	culture	was	an	outcome	of	a	consensus	pro-
cess	and	therefore	posed	in	the	singular,	I	use	political	culture	in	Williams’	hegemonic	sense	as	
a	relational	term	indicating	the	mutual	existence	of	multiple,	overlapping	and	competing	cul-
tures.	In	this	view,	and	following	on	anthropological	studies	of	state	formation	(Joseph	&	
Nugent	1994),	sovereignty	(Hansen	and	Stepputat	2005)	and	political	cosmology	(Kapferer	
1988),	the	cultures	of	politics	are	shot	through	with	unequal	power	relations	and	combine	
historical	moralities	and	class	alliances	with	what	Thomas	Blom	Hansen	calls	‘repertoires	of	
authority’	that	rely	on	implicit	or	explicit	threats	of	violence	(Hansen	2005).	Not	merely	‘val-
Preprint	 	 November	2015	
 6	
ues’,	as	suggested	by	Almond	and	Verba,	political	culture	as	I	use	it	here,	points	to	the	con-
tested	interlocking	of	thought	and	action	that	saturate	participation	in	political	domains,	yet	
retains	–	as	highlighted	by	the	Vigh	and	Jensen	in	the	introduction	–	the	semiotic	uncertainty	
of	the	spectral	and	the	spectacular	since	political	performances	must	constantly	be	read	and	
misread	to	be	consumed.	
These	complications	of	political	cultures	–	contested,	disjunctural,	performative	–	sug-
gest	that	they	should	be	studied	as	processual	and	relational	rather	than	frozen	institutionali-
zations	of	privilege.	Such	a	perspective	resonates	well	with	Nepal’s	political	history	where	a	
centralistic	state	system	based	on	high-caste,	urban,	male	elites	from	the	country’s	hilly	areas	
have	met	with	repertoires	of	resistance	ranging	from	evasion	and	‘foot-dragging’	to	outright	
revolt	during	its	2-3	centuries	of	state-formation	(Kondos	1994;	Gellner	2008).	The	Maoist	
ruptures	of	these	engrained	features	of	everyday	state	sovereignty	during	the	decade-long	
‘People’s	War’	built	on	past	experiences	of	opposition	but	made	the	cultural	component	of	
elite	power	a	primary	populist	target,	turning	high-caste	Hindu	religious	practices	into	a	sym-
bolic	struggle	against	upper	caste	dominance.	This	was	not	wholly	unwarranted	since	the	sym-
bolic	framework	of	Nepal	as	a	Hindu	state,	ruled	by	the	enlightened	representatives	of	the	God	
Vishnu,	constituted	one	of	the	important	legitimizations	for	caste	rule	(Riaz	and	Basu	2007).	As	
argued	by	the	French	anthropologist	Marie	Lecomte-Tilouine	(2009),	the	Maoist	revolution,	
alongside	its	political	components	of	reforming	the	state	and	redistributing	land	ownership,	
became	a	cultural	revolution	targeting	ritual	prohibitions	against	the	sharing	of	food	and	the	
sacrality	of	cows,	associated	with	the	Parbatiya	high-caste	Hindus	and	constituting	the	coun-
try’s	political,	economic	and	social	elite.	If	we	try	to	make	sense	of	Maoist	mobilization,	both	
during	and	after	the	war,	without	accounting	for	this	strong	cultural	component	of	rule	and	
Maoist	attempts	at	breaking	this	dominance,	we	lose	a	very	essential	part	of	the	political	
struggle	that	the	CPN-M	has	been	waging	and	an	important	component	of	why	so	many	peo-
ple	joined	its	ranks.	The	Williamian	perspective	on	political	cultural	formations	can	thus	help	
us	understand	the	ways	in	which	themes	like	generation,	authorities	and	futures	are	grounded	
in	the	context	of	Nepal’s	post-revolutionary	transition.		
The	surprising	historical	success	of	the	Maoist	movement	in	Nepal	can	hardly	be	ade-
quately	analyzed	without	a	detailed	understanding	of	the	deep-seated	social,	economic	and	
political	disparities	prevalent	in	the	rural	areas	where	incomes	are	only	a	fifth	of	what	they	are	
in	the	capital	(Hutt	2004b).		After	the	liberalization	in	1990	where	Kathmandu	quickly	modern-
ized,	the	persistence	of	engrained	hierarchies	along	caste,	ethnic	and	gender	lines	constituted	
a	fertile	environment	for	the	growth	of	the	Maoists	(as	predicted	by	Richard	Nickson	1992).	
However,	what	remain	to	be	explained	is	through	what	idioms	this	mobilization	occurred	and	
how	the	“crisis	of	hegemony”	identified	by	others	(Shneiderman	2003)	became	engulfed	in	
new,	emergent	political	cultures	with	the	aim	of	transcending	histories	of	violent	state	for-
mation.	By	looking	at	how	the	Maoist	identified	a	hegemonic	political	cultural	form	to	oppose	
and	the	ways	in	which	they	mobilized	support	for	their	“emergent”	perspective,	it	becomes	
possible	to	paint	a	nuanced	picture	of	how	Maoist	politics	resisted,	reinvented	as	well	as	re-
produced	concurrent	forms	of	political	culture	in	their	struggle	to	transform	their	war-time	
successes	to	a	post-conflict	context.		
Generation	and	the	growth	of	youth	politics	
Rohit	is	a	19-year	old	man	from	Southern	Nepal	whose	mobilization	into	the	party	is	illustra-
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tive	of	the	new	generation	of	members	who	had	joined	the	movement	after	the	war.	Rohit	had	
grown	up	in	a	small	Tamang	village	in	the	Himalayan	foothills	together	with	his	four	younger	
siblings.5	The	family	survived	by	growing	vegetables	and	raising	animals	on	the	small	plots	of	
land	surrounding	their	house,	trading	and	selling	surplus	food	for	rice,	oil,	and	other	basic	
household	items.	There	was	a	small	school	in	the	village	which	Rohit	attended	between	chores	
at	home	but	at	the	age	of	8,	he	was	invited	to	join	an	elder	cousin	who	worked	in	a	carpet	fac-
tory	in	Kathmandu.	Rohit	continued	in	school	for	a	while	but	explained	that	he	had	“no	inter-
est	in	studying”	and	he	quit	school	in	grade	five	to	pursue	kick-boxing	with	friends.	Over	the	
next	many	years,	Rohit	roamed	around	between	half-hearted	jobs	and	leisure	activities	bounc-
ing	around	between	family	and	friends	in	Kathmandu,	Chitwan,	Maharashtra	in	India,	and	his	
home	village.	He	knitted	carpets	in	Kathmandu	but	found	it	boring,	went	to	a	dancing	school	at	
his	aunt’s	house	in	India	but	could	not	understand	the	language,	returned	for	a	spell	to	work	in	
the	city,	then,	after	failing	to	find	money	for	language	studies,	took	off	to	work	in	the	construc-
tion	industry	in	Agra.	In	between	all	this	he	came	back	to	stay	with	his	family	and	talk	to	
friends	about	where	to	go	next.	At	the	age	of	16,	Rohit	felt	he	had	to	make	a	choice.	One	of	his	
friends,	who	had	been	a	member	of	the	CPN-M	for	a	while,	started	telling	him	about	the	
movement’s	ideology,	in	particular	their	efforts	at	combating	the	poverty	of	which	rural	ethnic	
minority	youth	like	himself	were	at	the	receiving	end.	Rohit	talked	with	his	friend	several	times	
before	asking	for	an	interview	with	one	of	its	leaders	and	after	being	briefly	queried	about	his	
background	and	reasons	for	joining,	Rohit	was	invited	to	stay	in	the	party	quarters	“on	proba-
tion”.	A	few	days	later,	he	was	accepted	in	and	became	a	full-time	member,	a	whole-timer,	of	
the	Maoist	movement.	
When	Rohit	joined	in	early	2007,	the	CPN-M	had	just	officially	emerged	in	the	capital’s	
political	scene.	In	November	2006,	a	Comprehensive	Peace	Agreement	between	the	political	
parties	had	been	signed	and	by	January	an	Interim	Constitution	was	drafted.	This	would	pave	
the	way	for	Constituent	Assembly	Elections	later	that	year	and	for	the	newly	elected	assembly	
to	decide	upon	whether	or	not	to	declare	Nepal	a	republic.	CPN-M	leaders	were	in	great	haste	
to	prepare	the	ground	for	elections.	While	a	seasoned	guerilla	movement	with	a	highly	effi-
cient	command-structure,	the	CPN-M	had	no	experience	with	electoral	politics	and	its	pres-
ence	in	the	cities	was	still	weak	(Lawoti	2009).	Just	as	during	the	war,	the	maobaadi	existed	
mostly	as	a	rumor	(Pettigrew	2013)	with	an	invisible	network	across	the	country	and	with	its	
cadres	in	plainclothes.	The	CPN-M	was	challenged	with	turning	their	widespread	clandestine	
movement	into	a	visible	institution	that	would	allow	it	to	field	candidates	and	carry	out	elec-
toral	campaigns	within	the	bureaucratic	order	of	the	state.	“At	that	time”,	Rohit	had	told	me,	
“everyone	was	talking	excitedly	about	maobaadi;	it	was	already	popular.”	
To	spearhead	its	transformation	into	an	urban	party,	the	CPN-M	reactivated	its	youth	
front	which	had	waxed	and	waned	from	its	days	as	an	underground	movement	in	the	1980s.	
Emulating	the	urbanized	European	communist	movements	in	the	early	20th	century,	the	Mao-
ist	announced	the	Young	Communist	League	(YCL)	as	the	forefront	of	the	party’s	move	into	
what	they	saw	as	competitive	“bourgeois”	democracy	(Hachhethu	2008).	The	YCL	was	officially	
inaugurated	in	February	2007	under	the	auspices	of	the	CPN-M	Chairman	Prachanda	and	with	
                                                
5	Tamangs	are	one	of	Nepal’s	102	ethnic	and	caste	groups	and	constitute	approximately	6%	(1.2	million)	
of	the	population.	They	speak	their	own	language	and	practice	an	animistic	form	of	Buddhism	in	con-
trast	to	the	cultural	hegemony	of	Hinduism	prevalent	in	the	country.	
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a	party	Central	Committee	member	as	its	political	leader,	it	was	reined	tightly	in	under	the	
existing	party	hierarchy.	YCL	grew	quickly;	moving	experienced	military	commanders	from	the	
war	to	lead	the	new	cells	that	sprouted	up	in	all	election	areas	of	the	city,	the	YCL	was	popu-
lated	with	young	people	like	Rohit	in	all	major	cities	of	the	country.	Within	half	a	year	YCL	
claimed	to	have	around	100,000	mobilizable	members,	of	which	between	six	and	seven	thou-
sand	worked	and	lived	around	the	clock	in	central	electoral	offices	(ICG	2011;	Skar	2008).	The-
se	were	the	whole-timers	that	Rohit	joined.	
The	prioritization	of	YCL	for	the	CPN-M	was	not	just	about	strengthening	a	new	institu-
tional	culture;	it	was	a	strategic	maneuver	to	inject	youth,	as	a	political	force,	into	the	political	
establishment	and	to	run	on	a	ticket	of	a	party	wedded	to	youth	issues.	In	2007,	there	was	a	
provision	which	forbade	people	under	45	to	occupy	certain	government	positions,	and	most	
leaders	of	other	political	parties	were	well	into	their	70’s.	By	contrast,	the	Maoist	party	leader-
ship	was	relatively	young	with	many	of	its	leaders	in	their	forties	and	fifties.	In	YCL,	youth	was	
defined	as	anyone	between	16	and	40,	an	indicator	of	the	gerontological	nature	of	Nepali	po-
litical	culture,	and	leaders	sought	to	use	the	YCL	as	a	political	statement	for	a	new	era	in	politi-
cal	participation.	Writing	in	a	new	party	magazine,	aptly	titled	“Youth	Voices”,	YCL’s	new	vice-
chairman	Uma	Bhujel	explained:	
“Responsible	youths	are	being	victimized	by	feudal	capitalism	and	the	harmful	
culture	of	imperialism.	Because	of	this	they	are	heading	along	the	wrong	path	[...]	
The	major	and	important	work	of	revolution	is	to	destroy	the	feudalistic,	capital-
istic	and	imperialist	culture	and	to	replace	it	by	new	values	and	a	new	culture	[...]	
A	beautiful	world	can	only	be	imagined	by	carrying	out	a	severe	struggle	against	
these	hazards.	To	achieve	this	in	practice,	YCL	will	take	a	lead	in	the	transfor-
mation	and	make	all	youths	head	in	the	right	direction.	
The	lucid	opposition	between	young	people	and	dominant	cultural	traits	very	soon	became	a	
mantra	for	the	movement.	In	public	as	well	as	in	the	party’s	internal	deliberations,	the	role	of	
YCL	as	a	movement	for	youth	who	were	actively	opposing	a	decadent	culture,	socially	as	well	
as	politically,	was	clearly	pronounced.	At	party	programs,	leaders	praised	the	youthful	per-
spective	of	its	cadres	since	it	was	“forward-looking”	and	“progressive”	as	well	as	untainted	by	
traditional	“superstition”.	Ordinary	members	also	contributed	to	this	genre	in	small	publicized	
essays	with	titles	such	as	“we	are	the	heroes	of	the	new	era”	or	poems	that	more	metaphori-
cally	spoke	of	“the	rise	of	the	beautiful	morning”.	In	the	many	private	conversations	I	had	with	
YCL	cadres,	this	theme	reverberated	throughout	the	organization	and	cadres	very	often	spoke	
of	their	decision	to	join	as	a	particular	productive	way	to	use	their	“youth”	to	fight	poverty	and	
get	engaged	in	politics	precisely	because	their	perspective	was	“fresh”	and	they	possessed	the	
energy	for	“transformation”.	
Closely	connected	to	the	pronouncement	of	youth	politics	after	2006	was	thus	the	
supportive	idea	that	the	post-war	compromise	was	a	time	of	transformation	where	changes	
that	had	until	now	been	impossible	and	which	could	only	be	dreamed	about	could	suddenly	be	
realized.	The	CPN-M	held	this	banner	of	a	“New	Nepal”	high	and	it	quickly	infected	public	opin-
ion	so	that	soon	everyone	spoke	of	the	possibilities	of	this	newness	and	the	possibilities	of	
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realizing	Nepal’s	democratic	aspirations.6	The	generational	theme	was	an	insurrectional	idea	
with	great	demographic	potential	(only	10%	of	the	population	was	above	55	years	old	in	2014).	
In	the	Maoist	vision,	good	politicians	were	now	suddenly	young	and	full	of	fervor	rather	than	
old,	wise	and	well-connected.	Yet,	these	were	clearly	positional	claims	whose	power	lay	as	
much	in	their	ability	to	mobilize	support	with	the	young	newcomers	in	electoral	politics	as	in	
their	ability	to	describe	Maoist	party	culture.	Indeed,	such	binary	rhetoric	seems	to	be	charac-
teristic	of	Nepali	Maoism	and	its	ideological	variant:	Prachandapath	(named	after	its	chairman)	
(see	Lecomte-Tilouine	2010a).	Within	such	a	conception	of	oppositional	cultural	forms,	two	
competing	logics	for	political	inclusion	could	be	pronounced,	one	based	on	the	energetic,	
transformative	nature	of	youth,	and	the	other	on	the	discredited	paternalism	of	the	old	elite.	
While	this	hardly	reflected	the	nature	of	political	decision-making,	whether	within	the	CPN-M	
or	in	the	other	parties,	it	did	allow	the	Maoists	to	differentiate	themselves	from	the	more	sea-
soned	party	cultures	and	to	emerge	as	the	party	of	the	young.	It	was	a	trope	but	it	was	an	effi-
cient	one.	When	Rohit	had	talked	of	the	sudden	popularity	of	the	CPN-M,	it	was	this	political	
momentum	he	alluded	to.	For	many	young	people,	CPN-M,	and	with	it	the	YCL,	came	to	signal	
the	potentiality	of	a	long-overdue	reform	of	Nepali	politics	based	on	the	rise	of	the	subaltern	
classes.	This	alliance	between	poor	urban	youth	and	the	YCL	was	crucial	for	its	initial	post-2006	
success.	
In	addition	to	its	rhetorical	effect,	CPN-M’s	youth	politics	was	also	an	effort	at	de-
professionalizing	and	democratizing	a	political	culture	dominated	by	Nepal’s	educated	high-
castes	from	the	urban	areas.	Already	with	the	war,	where	the	movement	had	survived	by	the	
cooptation	of	rural	hill	societies,	the	pursuing	of	a	non-dominant	alternative	political	formula	
had	been	essential	for	the	movement.	But	during	the	war,	the	focus	had	largely	been	on	caste	
and	ethnic	plurality,	captured	in	the	Nepali	term	jati,	as	well	as	the	equal	role	for	women	as	
fighters	(de	Sales	2000;	Pettigrew	2013).	In	the	post-war	context,	these	other	social	distinc-
tions	were	downplayed	–	leading	to	a	break	with	one	of	its	crucial	ethnic	wings	in	January	2009	
–	and	instead	generation	moved	to	the	center	of	CPN-M’s	efforts	at	formulating	an	alternative	
model	of	political	power.	The	leadership	developed	their	“1-in-3”	policy	which	assured	the	
representation	of	one	youth	for	every	2	members	above	forty	years	old	in	all	committees	and	
for	the	upcoming	election	the	party	fielded	an	unprecedented	number	of	candidates	in	the	
youth	category	(below	40)	from	districts	around	the	country.	After	assuming	power	in	August	
2008,	the	CPN-M	created	a	youth	ministry	and	until	their	political	marginalization	in	mid-2009	
they	continued	to	prioritize	youth	as	an	important	policy	issue	and	a	source	of	power.	
Nepal’s	rapidly	changing	demography	in	the	past	decades	helped	push	the	youth	issue	
to	the	forefront	of	the	post-war	political	agenda;	in	2014,	more	than	50%	of	the	population	
were	below	the	age	of	24.	CPN-M	efforts	at	challenging	the	dominance	of	other	parties	by	
harnessing	the	demographic	force	of	youth	was	quickly	copied	by	other	parties	who	in	short	
succession	established	their	own	youth	fronts.	The	conservative	Nepali	Congress	formed	the	
Tarun	Dal	while	the	more	liberal	CPN-UML	created	Youth	Force	partly	in	order	to	stem	the	
flow	of	youth	into	the	YCL	and	partly	so	as	to	be	able	to	engage	the	Maoist	forces	in	the	
                                                
6	References	for	these	aspirations	go	back	more	than	five	decades	when	the	first	democratic	revolution	
in	1950	unfolded.	Between	1960	and	1990,	Nepal	was	ruled	by	a	royal	autocratic	regime,	where	parlia-
mentary	parties	were	once	more	been	suspended	and	only	after	1990	was	parliamentary	power	re-
stored.	
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streets.	But,	while	one	struggle	of	youth	took	place	in	the	open	between	rival	political	youth	
fronts,	the	Maoist	theorization	of	youth	as	a	new	source	of	political	authority	–	not	merely	a	
weapon	–	unleashed	some	very	interesting	conflicts	between	different	notions	of	the	societal	
role	of	youth.	
Maoist	mid-level	leaders	aggressively	disseminated	the	new	conception	of	youth	as	a	
mobilization	device	and	by	the	time	I	arrived	in	early	2009,	recruiters	employed	the	idea	of	
youth	as	a	particular	potent	social	force	when	talking	to	new	and	prospective	members.	Some,	
like	the	senior	cadre	Marut	who	had	participated	in	the	war,	explained	how	young	people	to-
day	were	much	more	conscious	than	10	years	ago	and	that	this	signaled	the	partial	success	of	
their	movement.	Others	were	more	concrete	about	the	high	unemployment	among	young	
people	and	that	they	were	therefore	more	inclined	to	fight	for	redistributive	change.	This	de-
termined	focus	on	youth	was	quickly	picked	up	by	young	activists	themselves	who	started	
speaking	of	their	activism	as	related	to	periodization	of	youth.	The	young	cadre	Himal,	who	
had	grown	up	in	the	same	village	as	Rohit	but	joined	much	later	had	been	working	for	two	
years	in	a	garment	factory	when	he	became	a	member.	He	explained:	
From	time	to	time,	cadres	of	the	YCL	would	come	[to	the	factory]	and	talk	about	
the	party.	It	motivated	me	to	also	go	and	serve	since	it	was	a	party	which	works	
for	the	poor.	I	asked	myself:	“why	should	I	not	contribute	as	well?	My	contribu-
tion	can	surely	make	a	difference.”	I	reasoned	that	if	youth	like	us	don’t	join,	who	
else	is	going	to	join?		
Himal’s	explanation	was	far	from	unique	and	emulated	the	concerns	of	movement	leaders	of	
appealing	to	youth	as	an	important	driver	of	mobilization.	Another	cadre	who	had	come	from	
a	poor	background	as	an	unskilled	child	laborer	and	had	initially	been	reluctant	to	join,	ex-
plained	that	he	eventually	convinced	himself	that	it	was	not	such	a	bad	idea	because,	after	all,	
he	said	“I	realized	that	my	youth	period	must	be	used	for	the	upliftment	of	poor	people.”		
These	bourgeoning,	if	programmatic,	pronunciations	of	the	political	potentiality	of	
youth	point	to	the	emergence	of	a	counter-culture,	one	that	is	strongly	supervised	from	above	
but	which	has	succeeded	nonetheless	in	recasting	Maoist	post-war	politics	around	dynamics	of	
youth	and	hence	as	a	special	kind	of	democratic	insurrection.	Youth,	in	this	Maoist	conception,	
has	come	to	stand	for	the	excluded	whose	sudden	participation	is	something	akin	to	an	act	of	
affirmative	action.	Yet,	the	authorization	of	youth	as	a	figure	is	inseparable	from	the	legitimacy	
it	lends	to	the	Maoist	political	project	and	thus	shows	the	imbrication	of	cultural	formations	in	
struggles	for	power.	Furthermore,	textures	of	youth	in	the	CPN-M	were	weaved	into	wider	
concerns	about	societal	transformations	and	cannot	stand	alone	as	an	explanation	of	why	
young	people	joined	but	points	to	the	nurturing	of	a	strong	generational	sentiment	in	the	new	
political	context.	As	most	newcomers	to	Maoist	politics	were	carved	out	of	the	livelihood	envi-
ronment	of	the	precariously	employed	and	unskilled	urban	poor,	Maoist	youth	politics	devel-
oped	in	dialogue	with	this	nebulous	new	class	subject.	A	closer	look	at	this	environment	is	
therefore	warranted.	
Competing	youth	cultures	
An	underdeveloped	national	economy	has	since	many	decades	pushed	able-bodied	men	
abroad	to	make	a	living,	mostly	as	seasonal	or	household	laborers	in	India’s	growing	cities,	but	
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increasingly	also	to	the	Middle	East	and	Malaysia	(Seddon	2005).	The	number	of	migrant	la-
borers	has	continued	to	rise	as	has	the	national	economy’s	dependence	on	remittances	
(Graner	and	Seddon	2004),	which	in	2011	accounted	to	almost	30%	of	the	nation’s	GDP.	In	a	
context	of	high	youth	unemployment,	the	remittance	economy	has	become	an	important	as-
set	of	kin	subsistence	and	local	household	economies,	particularly	in	the	rural	areas	where	
access	to	education	has	continued	to	be	poor	and	discriminatory	(Sharma	and	Donini	2012).	
This	has	put	a	mounting	pressure	on	new	generations	to	contribute	to	the	household	economy	
through	migrant	work.	Rohit’s	narrative	of	his	shifting	engagements	is	a	good	example	of	the	
intricate	ways	his	own	search	for	meaningful	futures	intersected	with	obligations	towards	his	
family	members	to	take	on	an	increasing	share	of	its	financial	burden.	Rohit’s	erratic	shift	to	
his	aunt	in	Maharashtra	to	learn	Indian	dance	was	not	just	a	frivolous	exercise,	but	in	fact	an	
effort	at	combining	his	interest	in	show-business	with	an	employment	strategy.	Indian	“cultur-
al	dance,”	he	had	told	me,	had	a	lot	of	“scope”	because	of	its	growing	popularity.	Rohit	was	
well	aware	that	he	could	not	just	escape	to	India	to	dance	for	fun;	it	should	contain	a	potential	
for	becoming	a	job	as	well.	It	illustrates	the	constant	negotiations	between	securing	different	
futures	that	disenfranchised	youth	in	Nepal	are	subject	to.	
In	their	late	teens,	many	of	the	new	cadres	joining	the	CPN-M	were	not	yet	required	to	
contribute	substantially	to	the	household	economy	of	kin	but	they	were	expected,	however,	to	
position	themselves	so	as	to	be	able	to	do	so	in	the	near	future.	It	is	customary	in	Nepali	
households,	and	definitely	so	in	the	case	of	the	rural	Tamangs	that	populated	the	YCL	office	
where	I	did	most	of	my	work,	to	collectively	share	the	financial	burden	of	the	reproduction	of	
the	household.	Indeed,	male	members	have	a	special	obligation	to	finance	their	sisters’	wed-
dings	and	the	building	of	their	own	houses	prior	to	their	own	wedding.	This	collective	burden	
is	not	easily	shed	and	while	the	young	age	of	new	post-war	members	still	shielded	them	from	
the	full	force	of	this	obligation,	it	constituted	a	very	prominent	moralizing	discourse	of	youth	
that	was	in	conflict	with	the	Maoist	conception	of	youth	as	a	time	to	serve	the	country,	not	the	
household.7	
The	perseverance	of	the	obligatory	kinship	economy	illustrates	the	complicated	“cul-
tural”	scenario	in	which	the	Maoist	movement	was	trying	to	erect	an	oppositional	political	
culture.	The	CPN-M,	in	effect,	had	to	“steal”	young	people	away	from	the	cultural	dominance	
of	the	collective	household	economy	and	open	up	a	different	collectivized	project	where	youth	
carried	connotations	of	liberator	within	a	national	framework	rather	than	as	a	“liberator”	of	
parents	and	siblings’	localized	trajectories.	This	alliance-shifting	from	kinship	to	politics	consti-
tuted	a	horizontal	competition	if	we	consider	it	from	a	class-perspective;	it	was	the	same	poor	
youth	that	could	either	work	for	kin	or	party	and	Rohit’s	and	Himal’s	most	immediate	decision	
was	simply	this;	to	labor	for	money	and	build	a	laborer’s	career	–	however	precarious	–	or	to	
labor	for	the	party	and	pursue	a	political	career	–	however	elusive.	Maoist	mobilizers	under-
stood	this	very	well	and	they	almost	invariably	employed	the	vocabulary	of	urban	precarity	
(During	2015)	when	talking	to	laborers	about	life	and	politics:	“look,	you	work	and	work	for	
                                                
7	Despite	movement	leaders	best	efforts,	the	moral	economy	of	filial	obligation	constituted	a	formidable	
pressure	on	Maoist	activism	and	seeped	into	the	fabric	of	everyday	sociality	when	members	spoke	with	
their	family	members,	ventured	outside	to	meet	their	friends,	or	returned	to	their	homes	for	visits.	
Occasionally,	parents	would	also	drop	by	to	check	on	their	sons	or	daughters	new	line	of	work	and	re-
mind	them,	even	if	subtly,	of	the	larger	kinship	network	of	which	the	young	cadres	were	part.					
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this	sahu	(master)	but	what	will	you	get	in	return?	He	will	become	rich	and	you	will	still	be	
poor”.	
At	the	same	time,	the	generational	problematic	of	youth	and	the	stagnating	Nepalese	
economy	opened	up	another	discourse	on	youth	tied	to	neoliberal	ideas	of	entrepreneurship	
and	allied	with	both	conservative	political	forces	and	the	strong	international	donor-
community	in	the	country.	This	business	model	of	youth,	while	not	as	homogeneous	as	the	
Maoist	version,	has	been	targeted	in	particular	at	educated,	but	unemployed,	city	youth	as	a	
way	to	stem	the	rising	tides	of	brain	drain	and	kick	start	the	national	economy	with	the	indus-
trious	“free-wheeling”	potency	of	the	young	generation.8	This	nebulous	force	received	its	pro-
grammatic	ascendancy	with	the	businessman	Sujeev	Shakya’s	“Unleashing	Nepal”	(first	re-
leased	in	2009	and	re-released	in	2014),	in	which	he	outlined	a	vision	for	a	neoliberal	“New	
Nepal”	based,	like	the	Maoist	vision,	on	the	force	of	youth,	but	here	completely	fractioned	into	
individualized	profitable	enterprises	and	value	chains.	While	the	entrepreneurial	youth	culture	
does	not	compete	directly	with	Maoist	mobilizations	as	it	is	directed	at	the	new	middle-class,	it	
does	however	suggest	an	alternative	political	solution	to	the	transition	to	prosperous	peace	
which	framed	the	idea	of	New	Nepal.	This	contrasts	with	the	remittance	economy	which	is	
stuck,	in	a	sense,	in	an	“old”	model	of	Nepal’s	development	trajectory	and	hence	exactly	the	
political	economy	against	which	the	CPN-M	poses	itself	with	a	vision	for	an	economic	self-
sufficiency.	The	neoliberal	model	shares	with	the	Maoists	a	disdain	for	the	gerontocratic	cul-
ture	of	the	old	political	parties	with	their	entrenched	corruption	and	systematic	in-fighting,	but	
it	is	similarly	critical	of	Nepal’s	unproductive	economy	and	has	sought,	like	the	Maoists,	to	
break	with	traditional	forms	of	obligation	since	these	are	stunting	creative	and	profit-seeking	
economic	practice.		
Seen	from	the	perspective	of	Williams’	cultural	formation	argument,	both	left	and	
right	forces	have	been	seeking	to	erect	an	alternative	to	the	hegemonies	of	entrenched	kin-,	
party-,	and	generational	structures	that	have	stifled	the	development	of	the	Nepali	economy	
and	the	reproduction	of	poor	opportunities	for	young	people	to	build	their	future	in	the	coun-
try.	They	share	enemies.	But	the	two	alternative	movements	have	also	built	different	alliances;	
neoliberal	culture	emerged	through	the	marketing	of	consumption	for	the	middle-classes	(see	
Liechty	2010,	2003)	and	has	paid	lip	service	to	the	finance	nexuses	between	business	and	polit-
ical	elites,	whereas	the	left	posed	itself	in	stark	opposition	to	conservative	elites	but	took	a	
softer	approach	to	the	migratory	labor	economy	which	was	the	only	avenue	of	social	mobility	
for	the	poor	classes.	This	de	facto	class	alliance	between	the	political	establishment	and	entre-
preneurial	youth	culture	has	complicated	CPN-M’s	shuffle	for	dominance;	while,	in	class	terms,	
the	Maoists	are	trying	to	fight	entrenched	privileges	for	high-caste	Hindus,	in	cultural	terms	
(“youth”)	they	have	been	engaged	in	a	battle	against	the	materialist	consumption	and	leisure	
of	an	educated	middle-class	ethos	that	has	engulfed	the	urban	environment	within	which	they	
operate.	
Reconfiguring	authority	
But	what	were	the	consequences	of	these	cultural	dynamics	on	the	new	generation	of	cadres	
                                                
8	This	is	one	of	the	areas	through	which	neoliberal	ideas	of	a	de-regulated,	entrepreneurial	economy	has	
influenced	state	policies	during	the	transition.	
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who	are	the	actual	subjects	of	these	policies?	So	far,	I	have	looked	at	Maoist	politics	within	the	
larger	force-field	where	it	has	developed	and	where	it	must	maneuver.	But	the	Maoist	party	is	
itself	a	grand	machinery	with	many	different	organizational	expressions	and	within	this	institu-
tional	framework	the	cultural	dynamics	of	youth	politics	gives	rise	to	yet	a	different	set	of	con-
tradictions	that	build	upon	those	already	examined	but	which	have	other	expressions	and	im-
plications.	As	highlighted	by	the	volume’s	editors,	a	convincing	analysis	of	mobilization	dynam-
ics	should	unfold	around	the	dialectics	between	organizational	modalities	and	individual	in-
volvement.	I	take	this	to	mean	that	organizations	become	actualized	through	the	concrete	
action	of	individuals	just	as	the	latter	are	products	of	their	interaction	with	institutional	life.	In	
Williams’	vocabulary,	it	is	the	site	of	“specialized	practice”.	The	analytical	power	of	this	frame-
work	is	to	suggest	that	mobilization	leaves	nothing	unchanged;	these	processes	result	in	the	
emergence	of	new	constellations	of	institutional	culture	that	are	the	unfolding	product	of	the	
meeting	between	powerful	institutional	frameworks	and	the	people	who	are	trying	to	fit	into	
its	nebulous	cloak,	changing	it	as	they	go	along.	There	is	this	constant	work	of	submission	
paired	with	a	pushing	at	the	boundaries,	willed	or	unwilled,	that	account	for	the	gradual	dis-
mantling	of	one	organizational	modality	and	the	slow	emergence	of	new	formations.	
For	the	CPN-M	the	external	pressure	of	moving	from	war	to	peace	and	the	growth	of	
its	cadre	base	in	the	urban	areas	led	to	some	minor	organizational	changes	but	actually	these	
were	surprisingly	few	(ICG	2010;	Hachhethu	2008;	Adhikari	2010).	The	rise	of	the	YCL	as	a	sub-
stitution	for	the	loss	of	its	army,	the	People’s	Liberation	Army	(PLA),	constituted	the	major	
institutional	change	and	new	members	joining	the	movement	became	part	of	an	organization-
al	framework	and	party	culture	with	a	proven	structure	that	was	sought	extended	into	the	
post-war	framework	with	as	few	changes	as	possible.	To	accomplish	this	continuity,	the	CPN-M	
used	experienced	leaders	from	the	war	to	lead	new	organizational	cells	and	new	cadres	joining	
were	therefore	supervised	by	members	with	a	solid	history	in	the	movement.	The	leader	of	
Rohit	and	Himal,	for	instance,	was	a	veteran	from	the	PLA,	who	had	already	served	as	a	com-
mander	in	the	war	and	he	was	backed	by	another	long-time	CPN-M	member.	While	data	on	
the	ratio	between	war	and	post-war	members	is	unfortunately	not	available	for	the	YCL,	I	only	
met	leaders	who	had	joined	before	the	peace	agreement	and	who	had,	for	the	most	part,	ac-
tively	participated	in	the	People’s	War.	
What,	then,	characterized	this	organizational	framework?	CPN-M	is	built	like	a	classic	
communist	party	with	a	central	party	committee	over-seeing	all	important	decisions	and	a	
fine-grained	layer	of	committees	below	that	carry	out	orders	from	above	(Rawal	2007;	Thapa	
2003;	Gersony	2003;	Lawoti	and	Pahari	2010).	To	ensure	vertical	integration,	leaders	of	one	
committee	are	at	the	same	time	members	of	the	committee	above	them	from	where	they	
receive	their	orders.	Keeping	with	the	Leninist	principle	of	‘democratic	centralism’,	the	CPN-M	
encourages	bottom-up	feedback	on	all	levels	but	expects	cadres	to	carry	out	orders	without	
questioning	them	because	only	then	can	complex	political	adjustments	be	effectively	imple-
mented	throughout	the	entire	organization.	This	structure	meant	there	was	very	little	negotia-
tion	over	authority	and	also	very	limited	ambiguity,	the	goal	being	transparency	and	uniformi-
ty.	In	fact,	in	an	organizational	culture	with	a	history	of	secrecy	and	thus	without	resort	to	writ-
ten	records,	leaders	sought	to	verbally	copy	the	direction	they	received	from	above	when	re-
laying	messages	thus	depersonalizing	leadership	roles	as	much	as	possible.	
CPN-M’s	authority-structure	was	in	crucial	ways	at	odds	with	how	authority	is	tradi-
tionally	practised	in	Nepali	society	and	while	it	may	seem	bland	to	Western	readers	where	this	
Preprint	 	 November	2015	
 14	
sort	of	functional	hierarchy	is	well	institutionalized,	it	appeared	quite	exotic	to	new	members:	
“Here,	we	really	have	to	submit	ourselves	to	the	leaders,”	cadres	explained,	not	without	some	
amusement,	“and	we	have	to	obey	their	orders;	they	command	and	we	do.”	Not	used	to	tak-
ing	commands	very	seriously,	even	if	people	in	contexts	outside	the	party	were	seeking	to	
impose	their	authority	in	similar	ways,	they	suddenly	had	to	learn	the	art,	not	of	subtle	evasion	
that	has	been	identified	with	classical	forms	of	resistance	in	Nepali	society	(Gellner	2003;	
Kondos	1994),	but	of	obeying;	directly	and	without	flinching.	As	Talal	Asad	has	also	described	
for	medieval	monks	in	Europe	(1993),	obedience	in	the	CPN-M	amounted	to	a	virtue.	
What	is	interesting	is	how	cadres	nonetheless	experienced	that	they	were	treated	with	
respect,	despite	their	junior	positions,	and	even	as	equals	of	sorts.	A	young	Tamang	woman,	
Damina,	had	come	from	a	small	village	within	the	Kathmandu	valley	and	had	wished	to	escape	
the	boredom	of	farm	work	and	the	predictable	life-path	of	a	low-caste	woman	from	a	family	of	
few	means.	She	had	found	a	job	at	a	garment	factory	on	the	eastern	end	of	the	city	where	she	
was	engaged	for	several	years	and	where	she	built	up	close	relationships	to	some	of	the	other	
women	working	there.	One	of	her	‘sisters’,	as	she	called	her	close	friends	from	the	factory,	had	
recently	joined	the	YCL	and	slowly	afterwards,	she	wanted	to	give	it	a	try	too.	She	soon	mar-
veled	at	the	small	changes	that	cadre	life	in	the	movement	brought	her:	there	seemed	to	be	
no	distinction	between	the	boys	and	girls	in	the	kind	of	assignment	they	received	and	while	
she	was	clearly	aware	of	her	junior	position	in	the	party	and	often	strained	by	the	complexity	
of	work	compared	to	her	experience	from	the	factory,	leaders	spoke	to	her	in	a	much	more	
respectful	tone	than	she	had	been	used	to	both	in	the	village	and	the	factory.	She	was	spoken	
to	using	the	formal	“You”	form	(tapaai)	and	only	rarely	scolded:	“we	are	treated	equally	to	the	
boys”,	she	explained,	“and	when	I	present	myself	in	public,	I	can	say	I	am	a	Maoist	cadre	
(maobaadi	kariyakatra).	
These	were	in	many	ways	small	changes	but	they	carried	important	implications	for	
the	subtle	shifts	in	structures	of	authority	that	accompanied	membership	in	the	CPN-M.	There	
was	a	widespread	sensation	throughout	the	organization	that	the	space	of	relationships,	while	
vertical	in	its	command	structure,	was	empowering	in	ways	that	the	young	members	did	not	
experience	in	their	relationship	outside	the	party;	here	they	were	subject	to	the	engrained	
authority	of	their	elder	kin	and	the	abuse	of	managers	in	the	workplace,	as	well	as	in	urban	
space	in	general	where	they	could	not	assert	themselves	with	their	low-caste	background,	as	
poor,	and	being	young	at	the	same	time.	Within	the	party,	however,	a	distinction	was	drawn	
between	traditional	forms	of	authority	that	were	based	on	experiences	of	inferiority	on	the	
one	hand,	and	party	authority	on	the	other	hand,	that	was	seen	as	fair	and	transparent,	even	if	
strict.	Even	more	importantly,	this	form	of	authority	was	dynamic,	based	on	individual	experi-
ence	rather	than	inflexible	status	or	age	categories;	authority	was	not	tied	to	persons,	it	was	
tied	instead	to	positions	through	which	members	flowed	with	growing	experience.	For	Damina	
this	meant,	for	instance,	that	already	after	a	year	in	the	movement	she	was	given	her	own	
small	team	of	newcomers	to	command	–	relaying	messages	obediently	from	her	leaders	above	
–	even	though	she	was	a	woman	and	some	of	the	new	members	she	commanded	were	in	fact	
older	than	herself.	Such	distributions	of	authority	and	gaining	of	worth	contained	a	contrast	to	
old	structure	of	power	and	created	commitments	to	the	Maoist	future.	Most	importantly,	it	
nurtured	cadres	with	a	sense	that	their	mobilization	carried	potentials	for	political	transfor-
mation	and	were	more	than	empty	gestures.	
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Partial	inclusion	and	youth	contradictions	
CPN-M	members	thus	became	engaged	through	a	dynamic	authority	structure	that	allowed	for	
the	growth	of	individual	careers	without	jeopardizing	the	top-down	command	structure	of	the	
party,	at	least	at	the	entry-level	where	there	was	little	room	for	abuse	of	power.	On	this	level,	
it	really	seemed	as	if	the	YCL’s	slogan	of	youth	empowerment	carried	some	traction	and	al-
lowed	for	new	experiences	of	cadreship	within	a	political	space	that	was	slowly	undergoing	
transformation	towards	a	new	and	different	patrimonial	future.	The	new	cadres	who	joined	
the	Maoists	in	the	post-war	years,	however,	had	other	identities	than	merely	those	of	youth	
that	seeped	into	the	movement	and	reflected	CPN-M’s	complicated	position	in	the	public	
landscape.	
With	the	levelling	of	members’	sociocultural	markers	into	a	generalized	category	as	
maobaadi	–	the	pride	of	Damini’s	new	identity	–	also	came	a	silencing	of	identities	that	were	
traversed	by	differential	privileges.	There	was	a	very	perceptible	distribution	of	jaati	(caste	and	
ethnicity)	marked	bodies	across	CPN-M’s	party	structure	with	the	central	leadership	consisting	
almost	entirely	of	high-caste	Hindus	and	the	party’s	fringes	populated,	in	turn,	by	marginalized	
population	groups	such	as	Tamangs,	Rai	and	others.	During	the	growth	of	the	movement	in	the	
war	period,	the	leadership	built	alliances	with	and	encouraged	the	formation	of,	ethnic	fronts	
fighting	for	political	inclusion	in	a	polity	ruled	by	Brahmins	and,	to	some	extent,	Chettris	(see	
de	Sales	2000;	Lecomte-Tilouine	2004).	The	Maoist	leadership	itself,	having	evolved	from	
Kathmandu’s	intellectual	elite,	was	almost	exclusively	upper-caste	as	well.	After	the	war,	it	
came	to	a	split	in	the	movement	when	its	high-caste	leaders	were	unwilling	to	pursue	identity	
issues	in	their	bid	for	rule,	and	this	led	to	the	complete	silencing	of	identity	within	the	move-
ment.	“Here,	we	do	not	speak	of	jaat”,	was	the	answer	I	would	get	when	broaching	the	subject	
and	sometimes	I	was	offered	an	expanded	version	that	“we	do	not	judge	each	other	based	on	
caste.”	This	anti-discriminatory	stance,	while	clearly	breaking	with	widespread	caste-rules	on	
interaction	between	differentially	positioned	groups,	thus	also	had	the	effect	of	actively	silenc-
ing	the	perpetuation	of	deep	divergences	in	who	had	access	to	the	party’s	central	commands.	
Similar	criticism	have	been	levied	against	the	party’s	gender	policy	which	looks	good	on	paper	
–	and	in	the	everyday	interaction	between	cadres	–	but	which	does	not	translate	into	women	
attaining	leadership	positions	(Manchanda	2004;	Gautam	et	al	2003;	Gayer	2013).	
While	these	discrepancies	of	inclusion	seem	at	first	hand	to	be	the	outcome	of	an	
identity-blind	policy,	there	are	indicators	that	these	institutional	inequalities	have	a	deeper	
subterranean	current	revolving	around	class.	Behind	the	differences	of	jaat	and	gender	lures	
the	question	of	education,	which	seems	to	be	dividing	members	internally	in	the	CPN-M’s	dif-
ferent	organizations	and	between	them.	While	there	are	more	than	two	handful	‘sister	organi-
zations’	within	the	umbrella	of	the	CPN-M	catering	to	different	occupational	sectors,	ethnic	
groups	and	so	on,	the	CPN-M	student	union,	the	ANNISU-R,	carries	a	special	status	(see	
Snellinger	2009a;	2007).	ANNISU-R	organizes	the	educated	middle-class	(and	usually	high-
caste)	and	mobilizes	them	to	career	politics,	as	they	go	on	to	become	leaders	in	the	CPN-M	
(though	not	without	problems,	see	Snellinger	2009b).	By	contrast,	the	youth	in	YCL,	most	of	
whom	are	uneducated	and	many	even	illiterate	when	they	enter	the	party,	remain	outside	the	
bounds	of	influential	party	positions.	During	the	war,	the	space	for	participation	of	lower	clas-
ses	in	forming	the	movement	was	made	possible	through	the	armed	wing	(Lecomte-Tilouine	
2013),	but	in	the	context	of	peace	it	seemed	the	CPN-M	has	developed	into	a	meritocratic	
principle	of	differentiation.	While	this	can	be	broached	as	a	class	neutral	option	in	contexts	of	
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a	successful	education	system,	in	Nepal	where	caste	and	class	privileges	translate	directly	into	
a	stratification	of	educational	options,	such	a	policy	risks	simply	replacing	one	kind	of	divide	
(gerontological)	with	another	(class).	Maoist	leaders	easily	reproduce	this	institutional	regime	
when	they	refer	to	the	YCL	as	“the	cadre	factory	of	the	party”,	acknowledging	its	importance	
for	supplying	the	power	of	numbers	but	failing	to	offer	an	option	for	integrating	class-
marginalized	youth	into	a	party	culture	stratified	according	to	educational	achievement.	
The	consequence	of	the	structural	blindness	of	class	politics	within	the	party	registers	
on	the	unfolding	cultural	politics	of	youth	within	YCL.	In	the	absence	of	discourses	on	caste,	
gender,	ethnicity	and	class,	the	cultural	formation	of	youth	comes	to	carry	the	weight	of	iden-
tifying	the	aspiration	of	cadres.	As	“progressive	youth”,	cadres	were	given	space	to	participate	
at	the	bottom	of	the	institutional	hierarchy	and	in	the	margin	of	the	political	field	through	a	
formal	hierarchy	that	was	in	principle	flexible	enough	to	allow	the	gradual	ascendancy	of	
members	as	their	experience	grew.	
But	youth	was	also	tamed,	and	subsumed,	within	the	larger	political	economy	of	Mao-
ist	party	building.	As	juniors	in	the	movement,	senior	members	easily	slipped	into	familiar	
forms	of	address	prevalent	in	Nepali	society,	including	in	the	political	culture	from	which	the	
Maoist	is	seeking	to	distance	itself,	of	sibling-relations.	Junior	members,	while	officially	just	
“comrades”	were	often	addressed	as	“younger	sister”	(bahini)	or	“younger	brother”	(bai)	and,	
in	turn,	youth	would	call	their	seniors	by	the	corresponding,	and	venerable,	terms	for	“elder	
sister”	(didi)	or	“elder	brother”	(dai).	These	were	seemingly	innocent	expressions	of	the	inti-
mate	relationships	that	developed	between	cadres	who	spent	most	of	their	time	together	but	
it	constituted	at	the	same	time	another	slippage	away	from	the	politics	of	equality	and	indicat-
ed	the	difficulty	with	which	the	CPN-M	held	onto	its	efforts	at	building	an	efficient	counter-
culture;	hegemonic	forms	of	social	distinction	and	political	reproduction	continuously	crept	in	
through	the	pores	of	the	party	and	came	to	constitute	a	new	patrimony.	
At	the	same	time,	blindness	towards	the	real	generators	of	political	exclusion	invested	
the	identification	of	youth	with	some	of	the	power	of	misrecognition.	While	youth	politics	in	
the	party	became	a	way	to	hide	the	lacking	inclusion	of	class	discrepancies,	this	at	the	same	
time	unleashed	its	power	as	a	master	signifier	around	which	struggles	for	change	revolved.	
This	had	curious	and	unintended	consequences	for	YCL	party	culture	as	cadres	began	to	identi-
fy	youth	with	a	psychological	state	of	mind	and	started	developing	a	self-disciplining	regime	
around	ideas	of	“proper”	and	“revolutionary”	youth.	Cadres	took	pride	in	the	ethics	of	frugal	
living	–	adopting	the	first	half	of	a	popular	CPN-M	slogan	“simple	living,	high	thinking”	–	and	
sought	to	distance	themselves	from	people,	and	in	particular	other	youth,	who	failed	to	com-
mit	to	the	ethics	of	simplicity.	As	if	cadres	were	punishing	themselves	from	being	poor,	an	
internal	and	bizarre	competition	between	cadres	was	visible	during	my	fieldwork	where	“lust”	
for	money,	untamed	desires	of	consumption	and	sexual	relationships,	and	strong	attachments	
to	family	and	friends	joined	in	a	curious	mixture	of	self-flagellation	and	cultural	criticism.	Rohit,	
for	instance,	was	worried	about	how	to	build	his	body	in	this	image,	to	look	strong	but	not	
vain;	Himal	wrote	poetry	and	trained	his	ability	to	express	feelings	of	happiness	whereas	Dam-
it,	on	the	other	hand,	returned	to	her	village	at	some	point	and	was	instantly	criticized	by	her	
closest	friend	–	the	‘sister’	that	had	motivated	her	to	join	–	about	her	inability	to	shed	with	the	
desire	for	“luxury”	and	her	filial	attachment	to	the	family.	
In	the	process	of	concretizing	the	new	youth	culture	that	the	CPN-M	was	formulating	
on	a	political	level,	YCL	members	developed	the	dynamics	of	competing	cultural	formations	in	
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new	directions.	When	we	look	dialectically	at	the	idea	of	youth	that	developed	in	the	YCL,	it	
opens	up	into	two	forms:	one	that	carries	promises	of	empowerment	and	is	a	force	of	potenti-
ality,	and	another	which	covers	up	the	simultaneous	disappearance	of	ethnic,	caste,	gender	
and	class	markers	within	the	organization.	In	the	meeting	of	these	two	moments	of	youth,	one	
liberating	and	another	suppressed,	YCL’s	distinct	development	of	a	cadre	culture	took	form	
and	this	gave	shape	to	the	larger	struggle	over	cultural	formations	waged	in	the	political	
sphere.	The	curious	outcome	of	this	development	was	that	the	youth	culture	through	which	
cadres	were	mobilized	and	integrated	became	transformed	and	turned	into	a	recipe	for	a	self-
disciplining	which	had	very	little	to	do	with	CPN-M’s	political	struggle	but	which	positioned	
itself	actively	with	regards	to	competing	urban	youth	cultures.	Thus	in	the	actual	practices	of	
cadreship,	the	content	of	the	struggle	between	the	dominant	and	the	subversive	is	given	form	
and	develops	in	a	different	direction	than	what	was	envisioned	by	its	leaders.		
The	confrontation	between	emergent	and	dynamic	forms	has	thus	not	only	been	be-
tween	the	Maoist	and	the	political	establishment	but	a	battle	fought	within	the	party	over	
questions	of	authority.	The	Maoist	elaboration	of	the	role	of	youth	in	political	culture	owes	
more,	in	fact,	to	the	patriarchal	tradition	of	caste-divided	Nepal	with	the	idea	of	social	service	
and	the	necessity	of	youth	to	achieve	training	by	seniors	before	acquiring	authority	on	their	
own.	The	youth	politics	practiced	in	the	CPN-M	is	in	opposition	more	directly	to	the	consumer-
ist	capitalist	youth	culture	even	though	its	political	rhetoric	focuses	on	the	gerontocratic	and	
elite-based	political	establishment.	This	shows	that	even	Williams’	vocabulary,	in	the	context	
of	alter-political	mobilization,	cannot	be	applied	without	a	concrete	dialectical	reading	of	the	
complex	relationship	between	formations	of	different	political	cultures.	Maoist	formations	of	
youth	is	“emergent”	on	the	one	hand,	in	relationship	to	a	high-caste,	urban	and	age-based	
autocratic	elite	and	it	is	“oppositional”	to	a	market-based	middle-class	culture	but	it	is	also	
“residual”	with	regards	to	the	recycling	of	traditional	notions	of	parental	authority.	This	com-
plicates	the	notion	that	Maoist	mobilization	simply	succeeds	by	offering	an	alternative	pre-
scription	for	membership,	as	the	evolving	dynamic	between	differently	positioned	political	
cultures	–	Hindu,	urban	and	kin-related	–	create	shifting	horizons	within	which	Maoism	is	lo-
cated	and	seeks	to	navigate.		
Conclusion	
The	CPN-M,	and	the	YCL	in	particular,	was	caught	in	a	three-way	struggle	against	both	the	
competing	consumerist	ideas	of	youth	and	the	remittance	economy.	As	party	members,	they	
were	opposing	class	enemies	that	they	had	no	relation	to,	i.e.	high-caste	elites;	as	poor	youth	
in	a	remittance	economy,	they	were	seeking	to	distance	themselves	from	ties	of	kinship	and	
this,	by	contrast,	involved	a	very	concrete	rupture	of	experience;	but	then	as	city	youth,	they	
were	disciplining	an	opposition	to	the,	largely,	middle-class	economy	of	consumption	and	lei-
sure	and	this	constituted	a	‘translation’,	and	displacement,	of	the	neoliberal	ideology	of	mar-
ket-driven	development	from	an	economic	to	a	cultural	realm	of	behavior.	
Problematics	of	mobilization	to	violent	movements	continue	to	haunt	the	political	es-
tablishment,	particularly	in	the	west	where	the	threat	of	“terrorism”	poses	complicated	and,	
also	sometimes,	uncomfortable	questions	about	the	“all-too-familiar”	nature	of	people	who	
find	themselves	at	the	forefront	of	apocalyptic	events.	In	the	context	of	Nepal,	the	YCL	was	
also	deemed	too	radical	for	a	party	that	was	trying	to	accede	to	a	liberal	political	framework,	
and	was	effectively	ostracized	and	“left	to	die”.	In	this	chapter,	I	have	tried	to	think	about	how	
Preprint	 	 November	2015	
 18	
violent	political	movements	mobilize	young	people	through	an	examination	of	the	formation	
of	new	youth	cultures	that	have	been	able	to	provide	directional	force	to	ideologically	un-
trained	cadres.	The	analysis	of	youth	presented	here	has	shown	that	far	from	being	a	neutral	
descriptive	category,	youth,	by	contrast,	become	strong	symbolic	figures	growing	out	of	dis-
parate	political	economic	forces.	By	thinking	about	the	political	competitions	within	which	
youth	gets	caught	up,	and	redefined	in	the	process,	I	have	described	Maoist	post-revolutionary	
mobilization	as	a	‘culture	war’	to	indicate	how	the	differences,	values	and	collectivities	identi-
fied	with	youth	became	a	battlefield,	turning	the	question	of	cadres’	future	as	well	into	a	bat-
tlefield.	
As	I	have	argued,	the	mobilization	of	the	working	poor	as	cadres	of	the	party	took	
place	within	several	competing	cultural	formations	that	were	peculiar	to	the	historic	moment	
in	which	Nepali	political	life	found	itself	in	the	immediate	post-revolution	years.	The	rise	of	an	
alternative	political	youth	culture	based	on	new	visions	of	Nepali	society	and	a	willingness	to	
fight	collectively	for	this	vision	resulted	in	the	development	of	contradictory	practices,	as	the	
CPN-M	and	the	YCL	tried	to	concretize	these	ideas	in	an	environment	of	competitive	cultural	
formations.	The	ground	underneath	postwar	political	culture	had	shifted	to	such	a	degree	that	
CPN-M’s	youth	ideas	was	but	the	next	clear	pronunciation	of	a	widespread	(cultural)	criticism	
against	degenerative	party	politics	–	cleptocratic,	corrupt,	even	ideological	blind	–	that	to	
some	extent	the	emergence	of	youth	politics	came	to	be	seen,	by	some,	as	a	form	of	relief.	The	
problematic	of	the	relationship	between	the	dominant,	residual	and	the	alternative	present	
themselves	here	in	a	slightly	more	complex	interlocking	than	proposed	by	Williams	due	to	the	
highly	politically	charged	atmosphere	in	which	CPN-M	politics	unfolded.	Despite	the	power	of	
established	politics,	it	has	slowly	been	losing	its	grip	on	the	claim	to	legitimacy	and,	by	way	
also	of	the	force	of	public	opinion,	the	emergent	youth	culture	of	politics	proposed	by	the	
CPN-M	seeps	into	a	much	wider	space	than	its	own	institutional	boundaries.	The	hegemonic	
itself	seems	to	be	in	decline	and	a	new	matrix	is	opened	up	where	oppositional	politico-
cultural	formations	are	competing	to	become	the	new	hegemony.	
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